Why the OLDER Japanese Constitution is Better Than the Philippine Constitution

Philippine Japanese Journal

Some advocates against charter change often cite that some countries have an older constitution. One example is the USA. The other example, surprise for some, myself included, is Japan. Some may say that a new constitution isn't needed because some countries have an older constitution. However, reading through the Constitution of Japan and comparing it with the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines, one can think about quality over quantity. The Philippines had changed its constitution from 1935, to 1973 (which I believe was illegal), and the 1987 version (which sprang out of a desperate need). I recommend reading both links that I just sent, to understand my point!

Can a shorter vs. longer constitution be the reason?

As I read both, the Constitution of Japan is surprisingly not-so-complicated. The Constitution of Japan would only be composed of 16 pages (printed on short bond paper). Meanwhile, the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines is actually 55 pages. There's a saying by Alexander Pope, "Words are like leaves. It's rare to find fruit among them." My late English teacher often berated two classmates of mine for long-winded verbal deadwood. As I read through the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines, I want to assume it's full of verbal deadwood. In short, the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines can be viewed as an unnecessarily complex mechanism, which can be difficult to upgrade. Call it an Articles of Incorporation with too many useless details!

It should be interesting that, according to the Constitution Unit Blog, countries with longer constitutions tend to be poorer and more corrupt. I would say it's because of overly complex steps, which in turn, make it difficult to fully enforce! I don't care if the information is new or old; it's all about delivering the proper information. Now, for an excerpt, which may explain why the Philippine constitution may be the root cause of more corruption than it seeks to prevent:

We first used data from the Comparative Constitutions Project (CCP) to compare the length (measured by the number of words), detail (measured by the number of words divided by the number of topics), rigidity of amendment procedures, and frequency of amendments for all OECD constitutions in 2006. This led to a puzzle: more detailed constitutions tended to be more difficult to amend, but were also amended more frequently! Because more rigid amendment provisions set higher voting thresholds against passage, proposed amendments that succeed must be the result of an overwhelming desire to change the status quo. Moreover, because amending a constitution is costly, few politicians would invest the resources necessary merely to change an innocuous provision. As such, the results suggest that more detailed constitutions are amended more frequently despite being more difficult to amend because they are more likely to contain restrictive provisions that impede the government’s ability to pass necessary or desired legislation.

Next, we ran a statistical regression to test the effect of constitutional detail on the economy of each OECD country during the late 2000s. Even controlling for standard socioeconomic variables, such as investment, education, and natural resources, we found that detailed or longer constitutions are associated with lower levels of GDP per capita (PPP). We believe this correlation suggests that detailed constitutions are more likely to prevent governments from adopting measures necessary to combat economic shocks. By contrast, amending constitutions (measured by the number of amendments) seems to increase GDP per capita, suggesting that countries that can more readily enact amendments can mitigate the negative effects of longer constitutions.

This of course begs the question: why do some countries choose to enact more detailed constitutions? We found that constitutional length is highly correlated with measures of corruption from both the World Governance Indicators and Transparency International. Longer constitutions tended to appear in countries that suffered from greater corruption. Because our data is limited to a single year, we cannot determine if corruption causes longer constitutions, or vice versa. We could imagine two different causal pathways. First, knowing that they cannot trust political elites to adopt sound economic policies, drafters might adopt longer constitutions in order to combat corruption. Alternatively, corrupt special interest groups could convince constitutional drafters to protect their interests from future challenges. In this case, longer constitutions would stem from elite capture and rent seeking.

However, it may not always be the case, as some better countries also have longer constitutions

The Malaysian constitution (which was enacted in 1957, amended sometime in 2007) and the Singaporean constitution (which was enacted in 1963, revised in 2016) are both longer than the Japanese Constitution. As I attempted to print both documents, I would need 240 sheets of paper to print the Malaysian constitution and 189 sheets of paper for the Singaporean constitution. The Philippine constitution would need only 93 pages. However, even through skimming, the Philippine constitution has one crucial flaw that isn't present. The big, serious economic flaw is Article XII, which is the National Economy and Patrimony. 

None of the longer constitutions or older constitutions, which I presented, has the kind of nonsense as Article XII of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines. In fact, if these nations decide to use a certain degree of protectionism, it's through legislation, not something enshrined in the constitution. For example, there's too much economic activity. It would be time to pass certain protectionist measures like tariffs on imported products. It might be time to pass legislation in favor of Filipino businesses, if ever they're in danger of getting destroyed. That way, it would be easier to make adjustments than if such provisions were enshrined in the current Constitution. It's because people think that if it's the law, it must be "inviolate". That's some strange logic we have there! 

Back in Japan, we also need to take a look at the form of government

Japan can have a shorter constitution for all I care. However, if Japan has something similar to Article XII written into it, it's certainly not going to fare well either. As we think about it, it's not because the Japanese are always necessarily more honorable than Filipinos, or that Japanese politicians are a "unique blend" of their own. Instead, we think about the form of government that Japan has over the Philippines. Japan operates under a parliamentary form of government. Chapter 1 has declared the Japanese emperor as a unifying figure. Chapter IV talks about the Japanese Diet, or the parliament. 

Some people think that great leaders fall overnight, or use certain economically successful countries to say, "Well, we can just amend the 1987 Constitution." However, the difference is that it didn't matter how many times the Philippines had a new constitution (1935, 1973, 1987)--they were all based on the presidential system. The presidential system is people-based over system-based. Can I really expect consistency with the term limits? Some people overpraise the late Benigno Simeon "Noynoy" C. Aquino III, as if he were so perfect. Now, let's say that Noynoy's term was succeeded by Manuel "Mar" A. Roxas II. Can we guarantee that Mar would carry on the same quality of work if ever he won the presidency? It can be doubtful since presidentialism cares more about the candidate than the political party.

However, the parliamentary system is party-based. For example, any good policy that Noynoy had as prime minister would be carried over. If Noynoy did well, he would be the best person to reappoint as prime minister if the Liberal Party won. However, if the Liberal Party didn't win the government seats but gathered a significant number of votes, the Liberal Party could serve as the Opposition. Let's say that Rodrigo R. Duterte was the prime minister under a PDP-Laban Government. The Liberal Party Opposition would be required to question the PDP-Laban Government and provide alternatives. In a worst-case scenario, the Opposition could call for a Motion of No Confidence. A Motion of No Confidence would've been a better way to remove Sara Z. Duterte-Carpio if she were a Deputy Prime Minister. 

Kyodo News

In Japan, the parliamentary system replaced the monarchy. In the past, the Japanese Emperor was considered divine. The replacement constitution removed that notion of a divine emperor. Instead, the monarchy is but a symbol, ever since Imperial Japan's defeat in the Second World War! If whiners are all wondering why Japanese politicians are better, it's because their constitution, despite being older, has better accountability mechanisms (read here).

Andrew James Masigan also writes about charter change. This can also help explain how a parliamentary system produces better lawmakers:

FEDERAL-PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT

As mentioned earlier, the Duterte administration plans to a shift our form of government from a Unitary-Presidential form to a Federal-Parliamentary form. To better appreciate how a Federal-Parliamentary system works, it s best to look at it in contrast to a Federal-Presidential system.

A Federal-Presidential system offers no change to the current system where the President is elected through a national election and heads the executive branch. He has no sway on the judicial or legislative branches except through party-line influence. The United States operates under a Federal-Presidential framework.

A Federal-Parliamentary system , on the other hand, encourages people to vote according to political parties. Here, the citizens elect their Members of Parliament (their representatives), most often, based on the ideology of the party they belong to, not on their personalities. The party with the most number of elected representatives is declared “the parliament.” The parliament elects its Prime Minister (PM) from among themselves. The PM, in turn, selects the members of his Cabinet (his ministers) from among the member of the parliament.

There are multiple advantages to this. First, the system does away with expensive and divisive presidential elections. It puts an end to the vicious cycle of presidential candidates resorting to corruption and incurring political debts just to raise funds for their campaign.

Even the poor can run for office so long as they are capable. This is because elections are funded by the party. In a federal-parliamentary system, we do away with people who win on the back of guns goons and gold.

Moreover, since the members of parliament selects the Prime Minister, they can easily remove him through a vote of no-confidence should he fail to fulfill his mandate. We do away with the tedious process of impeachment. And since the ministers are selected from the Parliament, no one gets a free ticket to the Cabinet just because they are friends with the President or nominated by a political ally. The ministers all have mandates and are accountable not only to the PM but to their constituents.

The parliament is a unicameral legislative body. Thus, bills can be made into law faster and cheaper.

A parliamentary system is one where a “shadow Cabinet” exists. A shadow Cabinet is the corresponding, non-official Cabinet composed of members of the opposition. Each Cabinet minister has a shadow equivalent who is mandated to scrutinize every policy done by the official minister. The shadow minister may offer alternative policies which can be adopted if it is deemed superior.

In the end, the systems allows policies to be better thought out with appropriate safeguards to protect the interest of the people.

Among the seven wealthiest democracies (the G7 nations), only US and France follow a presidential system. the rest subscribe to a parliamentary system.

The intentions of charter change is good. Done right, it could be a game changer for the nation.

A shame that the Philippine constitution is supposedly "newer". However, consider it a defective upgrade from the 1973 Constitution, in some areas. Sure, we Bill of Rights ,but it fails with both its economic and political provisions. The parliamentary system has proven itself better. But Filipinos tend to always associate it with the late Ferdinand E. Marcos Sr. and his Batasang Pambansa (National Assembly). However, if they're still thinking that, remember the late Benigno Simeon A. Aquino Jr., who once said in his Los Angeles speech, "We had a parliamentary form of government, without a parliament." Later in Japan, the late Salvador "Doy" Laurel Jr. even challenged Marcos Sr.'s legitimacy. Marcos was never officially recognized as president or prime minister. At one point, Marcos Sr. made himself both president and prime minister. Later on, Cesar Virata (read more here) was but the Head of Cabinet and was more of a presidential adviser. In the parliamentary system, the president is but a symbolic Head of State.

The Philippines is still stuck with the popularity-based system. It's not about DNA or anything. It's all about systems!